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INTRODUCTION

In the decade from 2010 to 2019, the Supreme Court has decided more
patent law cases than in the prior three decades combined and nearly twice that of
any prior decade since the 1952 Patent Act. 1 This increase in patent cases has
occurred despite a marked decrease in the number of cases accepted for review by
the Court. In recent years, the Supreme Court has decided roughly half the number
of cases as it did in the 1970s or 80s. 2 In the last decade, however, patent opinions
increased to more than 5% of issued Supreme Court opinions versus only 0.5% in
the 1980s.3 In other words, as a percentage of its opinions, the Supreme Court
heard nearly ten times as many patent cases in the decade from 2010 to 2019 as it
did in the 1980s, when Congress first created the Federal Circuit with the purpose
of nationally unifying patent law. 4
Number of Supreme Court Patent Cases by Decade
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Figure 1. Supreme Court Patent Cases by Decade
Shows the number of patent opinions issued per year by the Supreme Court by
decade, counting back from 2019 to the enactment of the 1952 Patent Act.
The years from 1952 to 1959 do not constitute a full decade. 5

Infra, Figure 1.
Infra Section ill, Figure 2.
Infra Section ill, Figure 3.
Infra Section ill, Figure 3; infra Section II.C; Federal Courts Improvement Act
of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1
(2018)).
Patent opinions since 1952 are based on the list of Supreme Court Patent
Cases maintained by Professor Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Stanford Law
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Some scholarship on this issue attributes the increase to the rise of a
specialized Supreme Court patent bar more adept at obtaining certiorari in patent
cases and the increasing influence of the Solicitor General in patent cases. 6 Others
urge that the Supreme Court in recent years is seeking to correct a Federal Circuit
that relies on overly rigid tests or approaches to patent law that differ from other
areas of law.7 Yet no scholarship to date has undertaken to qualitatively test the
reasons for the increase by examining not only the theory, but also the viewpoints
of those with direct experience in the certiorari process in patent cases.
Prior studies have looked at correlative factors associated with Supreme
Court decisions to grant the writ of certiorari, as well as correlative factors
associated with review of Federal Circuit decisions.s Quantitative analysis,
however, cannot determine for certain whether correlative factors are also
causative. Beginning to address the gap, nearly two decades ago, political scientist
H.W. Perry interviewed justices and former clerks seeking to ascertain what drives
the Court's decisions to accept a case for review. 9 His book outlining these
interviews provided a critical new understanding of the certiorari process. 10
Nonetheless, that analysis did not answer a missing piece of the certiorari puzzle,
namely, how does the Supreme Court decide how to hear cases when the factors
that drive decisions in ordinary cases, such as circuit splits, are not applicable? In
the patent context, where the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction among the

School. Lisa Larrimore Ouellette et al., Supreme Court Patent Cases, WRITTEN
DESCRIPTION, https://writtendescription.blogspot.corn/p/patents-scotus.html
[https://perma.cc/7Q25-CTG6] (last visited Aug. 17, 2020).

See John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the
Bar of Patents, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 286-93 (2002); see also Paul R.
Gugliuzza, The Supreme Court Bar at the Bar of Patents, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1233, 1246, 1253-58 (2020).

See Tejas N. Narechania, Certiorari, Universality, and a Patent Puzzle, 116
MICH. L. REV. 1345, 1348 (2018).
E.g., Ryan Stephenson, Federal Circuit Cases Selection at the Supreme Court: An
Empirical Analysis, 102 GEO. L.J. 271, 272 (2013).
H.W. PERRY, DEODING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT 247 (1991) (reporting on interviews with former justices and
clerks).
JO

See id. at 246 (including statements by clerks and the justices on the
procedures of the court, including the logistics of certiorari decisions).
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appellate courts, the Supreme Court must rely on other factors to drive its
determination of when to accept a case for review.11
The need for qualitative data on the patent certiorari process is
particularly important at this time. The Supreme Court's increased patent docket
has a derivative impact on the economy. 12 Tens of thousands of businesses in the
United States and around the world rely upon United States patent law to
structure their new products and investments. 13 It also is the driving force for
research and development for a technological society. 14 A change in the law from
the Supreme Court can impact whether patents are valid, whether products are
infringed, whether patents are enforceable, or the amount of recoverable
damages. 15 These changes can destabilize and revalue millions of investments in
technology and pharmaceuticals.16 In some cases, the patent law decisions of the
United States Supreme Court can change the viability of industries or the standing
of the United States as a leader in innovation.17
Addressing these gaps, the Author of this Article conducted structured
interviews with former Supreme Court clerks and others involved in the certiorari
process, with a focus on what drives the selection of certiorari petitions in patent
cases. To protect the privacy of the interviewees, the information reported below
is based on aggregated responses to these interviews, except where noted. The
results of these interviews show that it is not, as many have urged, primarily an
increased interest by the Supreme Court in patent law driving the increasing
number of patent cases reviewed by the Supreme Court. Rather, the Author

11

Infra Part V.

12

See Kevin Madigan & Adam Mossoff, Turning Gold into Lead: Haw Patent
Eligibility Doctrine Is Undermining U.S. Leadership in Innovation, 24 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 939, 94&-47 (2017).

13

See USPTO, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TIIE U.S. ECONOMY: INDUSTRIES IN
Focus (March 2012) at vi,
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/news/publications/IP_Report_Mar
ch_2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q7B9-W6Q5].

14

Dirk Czamitzki & Andrew A. Toole, Patent Protection, Market Uncertainty,
and R&D Investment, 93 REV. ECON. & STAT. 147 (2011),
https://pubag.nal.usda.gov/download/53785/PDF [https://perma.cc/GJF3
PUAU].

15

E.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 610 (2010) (determining what types of
inventions are eligible for patenting).

16

See Madigan & Mossoff, supra note 12, at 94&-47.

17

See id.
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concluded from these interviews that Supreme Court review of Federal Circuit
decisions is a multi-faceted decision-making process based not only on the merits
of a particular case, but also on policy, timing, and the influence of expert
advocates and amici. It is also driven by a unique narrative of the Federal Circuit
as rogue, a narrative that those seeking certiorari use to buttress their petitions in
an attempt to increase the likelihood of obtaining review of their case. For example,
many petitions argue that the Federal Circuit creates overly rigid rules in its
holdings in its attempt to normalize and unify patent law. 18 Additionally, the
reports of some of the interviewees suggest that another reason for the rise of
patent cases is that patent cases are not seen as ideologically divisive; in a time of
noticeable ideological division at the Court, patent cases are unusual in their
ability to generate unfractured and often unanimous majority opinions.
Part I of this Article provides a brief background on certiorari decision
making at the Supreme Court and the history of the Supreme Court's review of
patent cases. Part II provides some statistics on Supreme Court review of patent
cases, which includes showing that the Supreme Court decides more than ten
times as many patent cases today as it did in the 1980s. Part III reports on
structured interviews with those most involved in the certiorari process,
comparing their reports of the key factors affecting certiorari to the factors
theorized in scholarship.
Part IV presents a normative or policy analysis of how the Supreme
Court's decision-making on certiorari in patent cases has impacted and will
continue to impact patent law, technological innovation, and the economy in the
decade to come. It also provides recommendations for considerations for certiorari
in patent cases. In particular, the Supreme Court in patent cases should give
particular weight to the impact of taking the case on the public interest, which in
patent law must include consideration of whether a decision would contribute to
or undermine the certainty and stability of the law. Indeed, in patent law, the
certainty and stability of the law might be the most critical factor.
II.

PROCEDURE AND HISTORY OF SUPREME COURT REVIEW OF PATENT CASES

A.

PROCEDURE OF SUPREME COURT REVIEW

To understand the factors that influence the Supreme Court's decision
making on a writ of certiorari, it is important to discuss the procedure applied in
the Supreme Court's certiorari process. Although the Supreme Court had

18

E.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health &
Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545 (2014) (No. 12-1184), 2013 WL 1309080.
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mandatory jurisdiction over appeals from lower courts in its early years, 19 the
Supreme Court's jurisdiction over patent appeals has been discretionary since the
Judiciary Act of 1891. 20 Most other types of appeals to the Court became
discretionary with the Judiciary Act of 1925, meaning that such a case would be
heard at the Court only if the Court granted a petition for certiorari. 21 "Review on
a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion." 22 A party who
loses on appeal before a federal circuit court or, in some cases, in a state court of
last resort may seek the review of the Supreme Court by filing a petition for
certiorari setting forth the question for review and bases that the party believes to
justify Supreme Court review.23
In the modem era, the Supreme Court receives approximately 7,000 to
8,000 petitions for certiorari per term. 24 The workload to review these petitions is
substantial.25 As one interviewee described it, this amounts to about a four-to-six
foot-high stack of petitions every week that the Supreme Court is in session. 26
Given this volume, the Justices must rely heavily on clerks to serve a gatekeeping
19

U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2 (giving the Supreme Court limited original
jurisdiction, but expansive appellate jurisdiction, including over cases
arising under the Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties,
controversies between citizens of different states, and other scenarios).

20

Evarts Act, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891).

21

See Judiciary Act of 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-415, § 237, 43 Stat. 936, 937 (codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1294 (2018)).

22

SUP. CT. R. 10.

23

See id.

24

The Supreme Court at Work, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S.,

https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/courtatwork.aspx
[https://perma.cc/ZKG7-GCY3] (last visited Aug. 17, 2020) ("Each Term,
approximately 7,000-8,000 new cases are filed in the Supreme Court. This is
a substantially larger volume of cases than was presented to the Court in the
last century. In the 1950 Term, for example, the Court received only 1,195
new cases, and even as recently as the 1975 Term it received only 3,940.").
25

Note, however, that more than two thirds of Supreme Court petitions are in
forma pauperis petitions that some consider to be less time-consuming to
review for cert-worthiness than paid cases. Peter S. Menell & Ryan Vacca,
Revisiting and Confronting the Federal Judiciary "Crisis": Charting a Path for
Federal Judiciary Reform, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 789, 866-67 & fig.25 (2020)
(charting changes in numbers of paid and in forma pauperis petitions from
1947 to 2017).

26

Interviews by Author.
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function, particularly by identifying petitions that do not merit review. 27 Clerks
will review the petition and prepare a memo for the Justices analyzing the merits
of certiorari and recommending the grant of certiorari, the denial, or in some cases
a call for the views of the Solicitor GeneraJ.28
In interviews previously conducted by H.W. Perry regarding the certiorari
practice generally, one Justice noted, "I usually could simply read their [the
clerk's] memo and tell whether or not a case deserved to be granted certiorari."29
Particularly when the clerk's recommendation is to deny certiorari, many Justices
will not read more than the clerk's memo.30 Of course, Justices have their own
views on important issues and might disagree with the clerk's recommendation or
want to read more from the petition first, 31 but the vast number of petitions makes
it physically impossible for Justices to themselves perform an in-depth analysis of
each petition that arrives before the Court. If the clerk's recommendation is to
grant or the Justice disagrees with a clerk's recommendation to deny, the Justice
will typically review a petition in more depth.32Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg stated
in 1993, "Whenever I think a case may be cert. worthy, I will do the homework
required and will not rely solely on a pool memorandum." 33
Currently, all of the Justices except Alita and Gorsuch participate in what
is called the certiorari pool or "cert pool." 34 Clerks for Justices who participate in
PERRY, supra note 9, at 70-71.
28

Interviews by Author.

29

PERRY, supra note 9, at 71.

30

Id. at 70 (quoting an anonymous Justice as saying, "First I decide if I can
make a decision on the basis of the memo. In fact, on most of them I can,
because most of these I vote to deny. If the case is a good candidate for a
grant, then I will mark the memo 'read.' Or I will sometimes mark a memo
read even though I would vote to deny but think that others will vote to
grant so I read them offensively and defensively.").

31

Id. at 70-71.

32

See id.; interviews by Author.

33

Linda Greenhouse, Word for Word; A Talk with Ginsburg on Life and the Court,
N.Y. TIMES Oan. 7, 1994), https://www.nytimes.com/1994/0l/07/us/word-for
word-a-talk-with-ginsburg-on-life-and-the-court.html
[https://perma.cc/WK87-U244].

34

Adam Liptak, Gorsuch, in Sign of Independence, Is Out of Supreme Court's
Clerical Pool, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/01/us/politics/gorsuch-supreme-court
labor-pool-clerks.html [https://perma.cc/6PYY-CN25]; Tony Mauro, Unlike
Gorsuch, Kavanaugh Jumps into SCOTUS Cert Pool, LAW.COM (Oct. 11, 2018),
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the certiorari pool will divide the work of initial review of the many petitions for
certiorari that arrive at the Court. 35 For all petitions where the Supreme Court has
voluntary jurisdiction, and therefore that need to be reviewed for a decision on
whether to grant a writ of certiorari, the certiorari pool clerks distribute this stack
of petitions evenly among the clerks for initial review.36 The clerks assigned to a
particular petition will prepare a detailed "pool memo" with their summary of the
petition, their recommendation on whether to grant or deny certiorari, and the
reasons for their recommendation, including noting whether there is a circuit split
and often how the petition fits among other recent petitions with similar questions
presented. 37 Sometimes, Justices will review only the pool memo, although many
Justices will also ask one of their own clerks to review and comment on the pool
memo to note agreement or disagreement. 38
Clerks for Justices who do not participate in the pool will review at least
the question presented, and often but not always the entire petition, for all of the
petitions that arrive at the Court, divided among the clerks of that Justice.39 The
interviewees note that having some Justices outside the certiorari pool helps to
provide a check on the pool recommendation. 40 Memos written solely for one's
own Justice tend to be shorter and more informal than a pool memo. 41 If a clerk
determines based on review of the question presented that certiorari is clearly not
appropriate, they might stop review of the petition and write a short note that
states why certiorari should be denied-such as the same issue being recently
decided-rather than writing a complete memo. 42
After the Justices review the memos prepared by their own clerks or the
certiorari pool, and often review portions or the entirety of the petition themselves
if it might be granted, the Justices will determine whether to place the case on the
"discuss list" -a list of cases that the Justices consider, in private discussion, before

https://www.law.com/nationallawjoumal/2018/10/11/unlike-gorsuch
kavanaugh-jurnps-into-scotus-cert-pooV [https://perma.cc/VK2M-ZZSX].
35

Interviews by Author.

36

Id.

37

Id.

38

Id.

39

Id.

40

Id.

41

Id.

42

Id.
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voting on whether to grant certiorari.43 Generally, the only cases that a Justice
places on the discuss list are those where the Justice believes both that certiorari
should be granted and that a sufficient number of other Justices may agree that the
case merits serious consideration for granting certiorari. 44 The discuss list is
initially prepared by the Chief Justice, then circulated to the other Justices, any of
whom may add a case to the discuss list. 45 Certiorari is granted if four Justices vote
in favor of certiorari at the conference where the cases are discussed. 46 Cases not
on the discuss list at the time of the conference and those that do not receive four
votes are denied. 47
B.

SUPREME COURT'S OFFICIAL FACTORS IN GRANTING CERTIORARI

The Supreme Court's published Rule 10 provides examples of
considerations that may merit the Court granting review on writ of certiorari, with
the examples applicable to most federal questions being circuit splits, important
but unanswered questions of federal law, and departure from Supreme Court
precedent:
Review on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of
judicial discretion. A petition for a writ of certiorari will be
granted only for compelling reasons. The following, although
neither controlling nor fully measuring the Court's discretion,
indicate the character of the reasons the Court considers:
(a) a United States court of appeals has entered a decision in
conflict with the decision of another United States court of appeals
on the same important matter; has decided an important federal
question in a way that conflicts with a decision by a state court of
last resort; or has so far departed from the accepted and usual

43

Id.
Id.

45

PERRY, supra note 9, at 43-44.

46

See id. at 43--44. Voting is conducted in order of seniority, although
sometimes Justices might pass to hear the vote of others first. See id. at 45.
Some Justices cast a "Join-3" vote, meaning a vote to grant review only if at
least three other Justices vote in favor. See Margaret Meriwether Cordray &
Richard Cordray, The Supreme Court's Plenary Docket, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
737, 777 n.208 (2001).

47

See PERRY, supra note 9, at 43.
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course of judicial proceedings, or sanctioned such a departure by
a lower court, as to call for an exercise of this Court's supervisory
power;
(b) a state court of last resort has decided an important federal
question in a way that conflicts with the decision of another state
court of last resort or of a United States court of appeals;

(c) a state court or a United States court of appeals has decided an
important question of federal law that has not been, but should
be, settled by this Court, or has decided an important federal
question in a way that conflicts with relevant decisions of this
Court.
A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the
asserted error consists of erroneous factual findings or the
misapplication of a properly stated rule of law.48
These considerations have not meaningfully changed since they were first
articulated following a 1925 amendment to the Court's rules. 49 The interviewees
noted that certiorari memos, especially when written for the certiorari pool, focus
on applying the Rule 10 factors, such as by explaining the nature, scope, and
timing of circuit splits.50
Past empirical and qualitative analyses have emphasized circuit splits as
a primary basis for the Court's grant of certiorari in general cases, citing the harm
of inconsistent law in different geographic regions. 51 The considerations named in
48

SUP. CT. R. 10.

49

E.g., SUP. CT. R. 35.5, 266 U.S. 645 (1925) (repealed 1928). In many prior
editions of the Court's rules, the considerations for certiorari applicable to
regional circuit court decisions were set out separately from the
considerations applicable to decisions of the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit. E.g., SUP. CT. R. 38.5, 306 U.S. 671 (1939)
(repealed 1954). The prior standard referenced only two reasons for review
on writ of certiorari: an important question that "has not been, but should
be, settled by this court" and failure to give "proper effect to an applicable
decision of this court." Id. A record of all prior Supreme Court rules is
available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/ctrules/scannedrules.aspx.

50

Interviews by Author.

51

See PERRY, supra note 9, at 247 (reporting on interviews with former justices
and clerks and noting that those on the Court viewed geographic uniformity
as important). But see Menell & Vacca, supra note 25, at 860 (urging that the
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Rule 10 are not, however, the only factors that affect whether the Supreme Court
will grant certiorari.52 The factors outside of the considerations in Rule 10 that
impact the likelihood of certiorari, discussed in more detail in Section III of this
Article, include the influence of the Solicitor General and of amici, as well as
signals of the importance of the question such as the dollar amount of judgment
and factors showing whether the petitioned case provides the best vehicle to
decide that question, such as the technical and procedural complexity of the case. 53
C.

THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION

The Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction of appeals of claims arising
under patent law, among other specialized subject matter.54 Created in 1982,
pursuant to the Federal Courts Improvement Act,55 the Federal Circuit is the only
circuit court of appeals with jurisdiction limited solely by subject matter rather
than geography. 56 The Federal Circuit's decisions apply nationwide in patent

declining number of accepted cases has resulted in fewer circuit splits being
resolved).
52

Infra Part IV.

53

Id.
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(l) (2018) ("The United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction ... of an appeal from a final
decision of a district court ... in any civil action arising under, or in any civil
action in which a party has asserted a compulsory counterclaim arising
under, any Act of Congress relating to patents ...."). The Federal Circuit
also has jurisdiction over patent appeals from forums other than district
courts: the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from final
determinations of United States International Trade Commission in Section
337 investigations, id. § 1295(a)(6), including investigations into the
importation into the United States of articles that infringe a U.S. patent. 19
U.S.C. § 1337 (2018). Additionally, the Federal Circuit has exclusive
jurisdiction over appeals from final written decisions of the United States
Patent Trial and Appeal Board in post-grant proceedings such as inter partes
review. 35 U.S.C. § 141(c) (2018).

55

Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25
(1982) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).

56

Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a), with id.§ 1294 ("Except as [otherwise]
provided ... appeals for reviewable decisions of the district ... courts shall
be taken ... to the court of appeals for the circuit embracing the
district ...."); S. REP. No. 97-275, at 3 (1981) ("The Court of Appeals for the
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cases. 57 The birth of the Federal Circuit began with the 1975 Hruska Commission's
study of the caseload crisis in the Federal Courts, which identified, among other
issues, a problem for patent law: the Supreme Court was not considering the need
for nationally binding judgments on issues of patent law, resulting in non-uniform
patent law in different regional circuits.ss In 1978, Professor Daniel J. Meador
proposed a new court of appeals with nationwide jurisdiction over patent law, tax
law, and environmental law, and in 1979 President Carter urged Congress to pass
legislation creating the court.59 After several failed attempts and narrowing of the
proposed jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit (eliminating exclusive jurisdiction for
tax and environmental law), the Federal Circuit was bom.60
Congress established the Federal Circuit with the mandate of normalizing
patent law, reducing the risk of inconsistent law across geographic regions,
improving certainty and consistency in patent law, as well as ensuring that patent

Federal Circuit differs from other federal courts of appeals ... in that its
jurisdiction is defined in terms of subject matter rather than geography.").
57

See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a).

58

See CoMM'N ON REVISION OF THE FED. CT. APP. SYS., STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL
PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE 15, 152-53 (1975) (quoting a
letter form Professor Gambrell and Mr. Dunner, stating, "It is our view that
the principal cause of circuit-to-circuit deviations in the patent field stems
from a lack of guidance and monitoring by a single court whose Judgments
are nationally binding. True, the Supreme Court technically fills this role but
in practice it has not and, indeed, it cannot. The few decisions it renders in
critical patent law areas, e.g., obviousness, have done little to provide the
circuit courts with meaningful guidance. The Supreme Court is just too busy
to perform anything even resembling a monitoring function on patent
related issues."); see also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A
Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 6 (1989).

59

U.S. JUD. CONF. COMM. ON THE BICENTENNIAL OF THE CONST. OF THE U.S., THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT: A HlsTORY, 1982
1990, at 4-5 (Marion T. Bennett ed., 1991) [hereinafter JUD. CONF. COMM.].

60

Id. at 5--6. However, tax and environmental law questions continue to arise
at the Federal Circuit in its review of cases from the United States Court of
Federal Claims, which has jurisdiction over actions for money damages
brought against the United States. See About the Court, U.S. CT. OF FED.
CLAIMS, https://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/about-court
[https://perma.cc/XN52-CJLH] (last visited Aug. 22, 2020) (explaining types
of cases frequently heard at the court).
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law issues were determined by judges with more expertise in patent law. 61 In
hearings leading up to the creation of the Federal Circuit, Judge Markey, who
became the Federal Circuit's first Chief Judge, emphasized, "[T]here is a crying
need for uniform judicial interpretation of the national law of patents, an
interpretation on which our citizens may rely and plan with some certainty."62 He
warned that the position of the United States in international trade had fallen, but
that the trend could be reversed by "investment in new products, technology,
under some encouragement that can be relied upon."63 This suggested that more
stable and certain laws applicable to technology could help innovation prosper in
the United States. 64 Although the Federal Circuit was given jurisdiction over
appeals in other areas of law as well-in part to avoid the dangers of excessive
specialization65 - Judge Markey highlighted the benefits of specialization with this
analogy: "[l]f I am doing brain surgery every day, day in and day out, chances are
very good that I will do your brain surgery much quicker, or a number of them,
than someone who does brain surgery once every couple of years." 66

61

See Dreyfuss, supra note 58, at 2-3, 7-8; JUD. CoNF. COMM., supra note 59, at xi
(discussing purpose of establishing the Federal Circuit). Nonetheless, some
scholars have argued against entirely centralized appellate decision-making
from the Federal Circuit. E.g., Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking
Patent Law's Uniformity Principle, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1619, 1623-25 (2007)
(arguing that a small number of competing appellate courts might be a more
optimal amount of centralization).

62

Court ofAppeals for the Federal Circuit: Hearing on H.R. 4205 Before the
Suhcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 12 (1981) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 4205]
(statement of the Honorable Howard T. Markey, C.J., Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals).

63

Id.

64

See id.

65

See Dreyfuss, supra note 58, at 4.

66

Court ofAppeals for the Federal Circuit: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
97th Cong., 42-43 (1981) (statement of the Honorable Howard T. Markey,
C.J., Court of Customs and Patent Appeals); Daniel J. Meador, Reducing

Court Costs and Delay: An Appellate Court Dilemma and a Solution Through
Subject Matter Organization, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 471, 482 (1983). But see
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal
Circuit Comes ofAge, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787, 788 n.4 (2008) (noting
potential for overspecialization).
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Because of the Federal Circuit's exclusive jurisdiction in cases arising
under patent law, 67 there are generally no circuit splits on areas of substantive
patent law. The exceptions are splits with cases prior to the formation of the
Federal Circuit, 68 or splits on issues of procedural law where regional circuit law
may apply.69 Because of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit over claims
arising under patent law, the Federal Circuit's patent law decisions rarely conflict
with another United States court of appeals to create a circuit split on a matter that
justifies review on writ of certiorari.70
The Federal Circuit issues both panel decisions (issued by the three Judges
who initially heard the appeal) and en bane decisions (decisions of the full court). 71
Often, when the Federal Circuit denies en bane review, one or more Judges might
disagree and write a dissent from the denial of en banc. 72 En bane decisions can also
be divided, with some Judges concurring or dissenting from the majority
opinion. 73 Although dissents from denial of en bane review or divided decisions en
bane provide some indication to the Supreme Court of the contentiousness of an

67

See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(l) (2018).

68

See, e.g., Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 60 (1998) (citing Timely Prods.
Corp. v. Arron, 523 F.2d 288, 299-302 (2d Cir. 1975)) (explaining that prior to
the Federal Circuit,§ 102(b) had a different meaning among the different
circuits).

69

Storage Tech. Corp. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 329 F.3d 823, 836 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(noting that the Federal Circuit applies the law of the regional circuit on
matters that are not substantive issues of patent law).

70

The Supreme Court has only granted certiorari based on a circuit split
involving the Federal Circuit in a handful of cases since formation of the
Federal Circuit. E.g., United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 826 (1984)
(addressing personal jurisdiction over a military officer).

71

Decisions of a panel are binding precedent on later panels until they are
overturned by an en bane opinion. See, e.g., Newell Cos. v. Kenney Mfg. Co.,
864 F.2d 757, 765 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("This court has adopted the rule that prior
decisions of a panel of the court are binding precedent on subsequent panels
unless and until overturned in bane.... Where there is direct conflict, the
precedential decision is the first.").

72

U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR 1HE FED. CIR., INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES 36

(Mar. 8, 2018), http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/rules-of
practice/IOPs/10PsMaster2.pdf [https://perma.cc/UG5J-V6MT].
73

E.g., Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1282 (Fed.
Cir. 2011).
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issue, the author understands from the interviewees, as discussed further below,
that they are not considered equivalent to a circuit split.74
Without circuit splits, in most cases, the only considerations listed in
Supreme Court Rule 10 that will apply to Federal Circuit decisions are the presence
of important, but unanswered, questions of federal law or departure from
Supreme Court precedent. 75 Like other grants of a certiorari petition-and indeed
perhaps more so than in general certiorari grants-other factors beyond those
listed in Rule 10 also have an impact on the Court's decision of whether to grant
certiorari. Part IV will further examine the importance of each of these factors.
As will be amplified in Parts IV and V, the Supreme Court does not
currently consider whether granting certiorari review in a patent case will promote
or undermine the certainty and stability of patent law. The Federal Circuit, on the
other hand, perhaps spurred by its mandate to promote the normalization and
centralization of patent law, frequently adopts formalized, bright-line rules that
differ from the more flexible approach usually espoused by the Supreme Court. 76
This tension between the Federal Circuit's rule-based approach and the Supreme
Court's preference for flexible standards contributes, as discussed below, to a
narrative of the Federal Circuit as a rogue appellate court.
Ill.

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF FREQUENCY OF SUPREME
COURT PATENT CASES
A.

NINETEENTH AND EARLY TwENTIE1H CENTURIES

In the nineteenth century, patent cases appeared far more frequently on

the Supreme Court's docket than they did at the end of the twentieth century. 77
Indeed, in a particularly active period at the end of the nineteenth century, the
Court heard an average of upwards of fifteen patent cases per term.78 This is in
part because until 1892, the Court had mandatory jurisdiction over all patent

74

See infra Section IV.H.

75

See SUP. CT. R. 10.

76

Cf KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 401--02 (2007) (rebuking the
Federal Circuit for the rigidity of its tests and noting, "Helpful insights,
however, need not become rigid and mandatory formulas").

77

See, e.g., Duffy, supra note 6, at 289 (explaining that the "golden age of the
Supreme Court's patent jurisprudence" was in the 1800s).

78

See John F. Duffy, The Federal Circuit in the Shadow ofthe Solicitor General, 78
GEO.WASH. L. REV.

518, 521 (2010) (showing the average number of patent
cases in Figure 1); see also infra Figure 2.
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appeals. 79 But even after jurisdiction over patent appeals became discretionary, the
Supreme Court in the early twentieth century continued to hear an average of five
patent cases per year. 80
Supreme Court Patent Cases Per Term Before 1952
30
25
20
15
10
5

0

Figure 2.
Chart of Supreme Court patent cases by term prior to 1952.81

79

See Duffy, supra note 6, at 293 (explaining that "[t]he switch to discretionary
jurisdiction allowed the Court" to hear far more significant patent cases than
it was typically deciding before the switch); Evarts Act§ 6, ch. 517, 26 Stat.
826 (1891).

80

See infra Figure 2; see, e.g., Duffy, supra note 78, at 522 (explaining how the
Supreme Court decreased the number of patent cases it took per year to an
average 5 cases).

81

Raw data and the final list of patent cases used is on file with the Author.
Selection of cases was determined using Westlaw searches for Supreme
Court opinions with "patent!" in the digest or synopsis, then cases were
reviewed and culled by research assistant Ella Jenak and checked by the
Author. As part of the culling process, the Author also compared the results
against cases listed under Westlaw's patent law headnote 291 to help
determine whether to add additional patent cases that did not fall within
this initial search and to flag cases for potential removal. Cases were
removed if they did not resolve a question arising under the patent statute,
such as land patent cases, cases arising under the antitrust laws even if they
involved patent products, and breach of contract disputes involving
patented products. Data from the very early nineteenth century might be
underinclusive due to errors in text searching of opinions from this time
period. The data tabulated for this Article correlates closely with Professor

586

AIPLAQ.J.

Vol. 48:4

The high frequency of patent cases at the Court during this time was
likely, at least in part, a result of the increased importance of technology during
the Second Industrial Revolution, potentially increasing the number of patent
petitions filed with the Court under its mandatory jurisdiction. 82 In addition to
being more frequent, however, patent cases of this era also frequently drew
lengthy, involved opinions on the substantive merits of patent law, indicative of
the importance of these cases and the Court's high interest. 83 Many of the patent
cases of the time, like Alexander Graham Bell's telephone patent cases, addressed
accessible, clearly important technological innovations that captured the public's
attention.84 Many were seminal cases that set the standards for the validity of
patents on revolutionary new technologies, like O'Reilly v. Morse, in which the
Supreme Court decided that technology underlying the telegraph-the use of
electronic current to communicate letters over a distance -was too abstract to
patent.as These cases not only brought patent law issues to the forefront of public
attention, but they set the stage for how patent law would be interpreted for more
than a century to come until the modem day. 86 The late nineteenth century was
also an important time for patent law due to major statutory changes, such as the
Patent Act of 1870.87

Duffy's separate tabulations of similar Supreme Court patent opinion data,
which began with cases under Westlaw patent headnote 291 and which he
then modified by additional searching. See Duffy, supra note 78, at 521
(showing that the data correlates to the given research here).
82

The Second Industrial Revolution, or Technical Revolution, characterized by
advancements in science and production methods, began in the latter third
of the nineteenth century. See The Second Phase of the Industrial Revolution:
1850-1940, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM (Nov. 8, 2020),
https://www.encyclopedia.com/history/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts
and-maps/second-phase-industrial-revolution-1850-1940
[https://perma.cc/GN4Z-SF8N] (last updated Nov. 12, 2020).

83

See Duffy, supra note 78, at 520.

84

See Duffy, supra note 6, at 275 (citing The Telephone Cases, which confirmed
Alexander Graham Bell's telephone patents).

85

See O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 135 (1854).

86

See Duffy, supra note 6, at 275.

87

See Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 55, 16 Stat. 198, 206 (codified as amended at
Rev. Stat.§ 4921 (1874)) (altering patent procedure including to permit
damages and injunctions in the same suit, among other key provisions
setting forth substantive rules, requirements, and defenses in patent law).
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1952 PATENT ACT AND BEYOND

B.

As shown in the introduction in Figure 1 and reproduced below, in the
decade from 2010 to 2019, the Supreme Court issued more patent opinions than in
the prior three decades combined and more than twice the amount of any prior
decade since the 1952 Patent Act. 88
Number of Supreme Court Patent Cases by Decade
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Figure 1 (reproduced).

This increase in patent cases is seen despite a marked decrease in the
number of cases heard at the Court. The Supreme Court heard roughly half the
number of cases in recent years as it did in the 1970s or 80s.s9

The Patent Act of 1870 also added the requirement of patent claims, through
which patentees were required to distinctly claim their invention. Patent Act
of 1870, ch. 230, § 26, 16 Stat. 198, 201 (1871); Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms
and the Common Law ofPatents, 90 B.U. L. REV. 51, 70 (2010).
88

See infra Figure 1.

89

See infra Figure 3. Data tables on file with the Author. Underlying data was
supplied by The Supreme Court Database. Harold J. Spaeth et al., The
Supreme Court Database, WASH. UNIV. L. (Version 2019 Release 01),
http://supremecourtdatabase.org/data.php?s=2 [https://perma.cc/PRJS
MJHE]. Results were filtered to only include Decision Type: opinion of the
court (orally argued).
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Supreme Court Opinions by Term Since 1952
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Figure 3.
Number of Supreme Court Opinions by Term.
Some scholars attribute this decline, in part, to increasing ideological
divisions in the Court. 90 Others attribute the decline to procedural changes: Justice
John Paul Stevens stated in an interview in 1998 that increasing reliance on the
certiorari pool caused "the lessening of the docket" because clerks in the pool have
a higher reputational incentive to recommend denial, saying, "You stick your neck
out as a clerk when you recommend to grant a case. The risk-averse thing to do is
to recommend not to take a case."91 Still others have suggested that the decline is
in part because modem justices simply vote to hear cases less often than their
predecessors or because the Government-whose requests for appeal are often
granted-is filing fewer petitions for certiorari. 92 Likely, the reduction in number

90

See generally Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme
Court's Shrinking Docket, 53 WM. & MARYL. REV. 1219, 1238 (2012)
(explaining a reason for the decrease in patent cases taken by the court may
be a result from changes in justices and their resulting ideologies).

91

See Liptak, supra note 34, at 1 (quoting a statement made to USA Today). But
see Cordray & Cordray, supra note 46, at 792 (noting differences in voting
patterns between Justices in the pool and stating, "Indeed, for the first fifteen
years after the cert pool made its debut, the number of cases granted plenary
review remained in the range of 150 cases per Term.").

92

See Adam Liptak, The Case of the Plummeting Supreme Court Docket, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 28, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/29/us/29bar.html
[https://perma.cc/3D4H-NBQQ] (reporting that Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
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of Supreme Court opinions per term is some combination of increased ideological
friction, changes at the Court, and differences in the views of current and previous
Justices on when and how often the Court should grant certiorari. 93
Despite the Supreme Court's generally declining docket, patent cases have
increased both in number and as a percentage of the Supreme Court's overall
docket.94 In the last decade, patent cases were more than 5% of issued Supreme
Court opinions versus only 0.5% in the 1980s. 95 In other words, as a percentage of
its opinions, the Supreme Court heard 12.4 times as many patent cases in the
decade from 2010 to 2019 as it did in the 1980s, when Congress first created the
Federal Circuit.

Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg had voted to hear cases less often than their
predecessors); Linda Greenhouse, Case of the Shrinking Docket: Justices Spurn
New Appeals, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 1989),
https://www.nytimes.com/1989/11/28/us/case-of-the-shrinking-docket
justices-spurn-new-appeals.html [https://perma.cc/X3MF-QSG4] (explaining
that the Supreme Court has dramatically cut back on the number of cases
heard); Cordray & Cordray, supra note 46, at 776 (Explaining of the Supreme
Court's docket system: "One of the most compelling explanations for the
recent decline in the Supreme Court's plenary docket stems directly from
changes in personnel. Recall that when a similar decline occurred fifty years
ago, the primary cause was the retirement of Justices who had voted
aggressively to review cases and their replacement by new Justices who
were far less inclined to do so."); id. at 792 (explaining the changes in the
Supreme Court's docket: "The single period of decline during this period
[after the certiorari pool began] occurred after Justice Stevens replaced
Justice Douglas in 1975. Neither belonged to the pool, however, and the
drop in the caseload is traceable instead to their very different views of the
Court's optimal capacity to hear and decide cases.").
93

See Menell & Vacca, supra note 25, at 867--68 ("The most likely causes of the
Court's declining caseload seem to be (1) changes in the justices' view of the
Court's role and (2) intra-Court dynamics. From 1986 through 1994, six
justices retired. Their replacements were less inclined to grant review than
were their predecessors. Justice White's retirement in 1993 was likely the
most impactful in view of his outspoken support for granting certiorari in
nearly all cases presenting circuit splits.").

94

See infra Figures 4, 5.

95

See infra Figure 4. Data tables on file with the Author.
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Percentage of Patent Opinions at the Supreme Court Since 1950s
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Figure4.
Patent opinions per Supreme Court term as a percentage of Supreme Court
opinions, compared by decade since 1959.
Nonetheless, the frequency of patent cases at the Supreme Court in the
last ten years seems high only when viewed in comparison to the late twentieth
century, a time period where the Supreme Court had far lower engagement with
patent law than it did in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.96 As shown
in the following Figure, in the late twentieth century the Supreme Court issued
only a fraction of the patent opinions that it did in the prior half-century and far
fewer than in the boom of the 1890s. 97 The Supreme Court averaged only one
patent opinion per year from 1950 to 1999.98 In the 1980s and 90s, the Supreme
Court issued an average of 0.6 patent opinions per year, a low rarely seen in the
last century-and-a-half.99 By comparison, at a peak in the 1890s, the Supreme Court
decided an average of thirteen patent cases per year. 100

96

See infra Figure 5.
See id.

98

See id. Data tables on file with the Author. There was an average of 0.96
patent opinions per term from 1950to1999.

99

See Figure 5. The 1810s had an average of 0.2 patent opinions per year. The
1820s had an average of 0.5 patent opinions per year. The 1950s, leading up
to and in the years after passage of the Patent Act of 1952, also had an
average of 0.6 patent opinions per year.

100

See infra Figure 5. The 1890s averaged 12.8 patent opinions per year.
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Supreme Court Patent Opinions Per Term All Time
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Figure 5.
Supreme Court patent cases by term since 1809. 101
As shown in the Figure below, the current percentage of Supreme Court
patent decisions is fairly similar to that seen in prior peak decades, namely during
the Second Industrial Revolution, and higher than prior to passage of the Patent
Act of 1952.102 In the decade spanning the 2009 to 2018 terms, patent opinions were
about 5.12% of the Supreme Court's issued opinions. 103 In comparison, 5.69% of
the Supreme Court's issued opinions were patent opinions in the terms from 1889
to 1898. 104 Indeed, in 2016, 9.84% of the Supreme Court's opinions were patent

101

Data prior to 1952 is based on the tabulation used in Figure 2. Data from
1952 and beyond is based on the data tabulated in Figure 1, which is based
on a list of patent cases maintained by Professor Ouellette. See Ouellette et
al., supra note 5. The Author chose to use Professor Ouellette' s list for cases
for the years from 1952 onward given the general acceptance of this list in
the academic community. The Author anticipates that the methods used to
identify patent cases will produce similar lists of cases and that therefore
few variations in the data will be attributable to differences in sources for the
list of patent cases pre- and post-1952. Supporting the repeatability of this
data, the data presented herein from both pre-1952 and post-1952 cases
aligns with the numbers of patent cases reported by Professor Duffy. See
Duffy, supra note 6, at 288 fig.1.

102

Infra Figure 6.

103

Id.

104

Id.
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opinions-higher than any term during the 1880s or 1890s. 105 Figure 7 also shows
a running average per term. 106
Patent Opinions as a Percentage of Supreme Court Opinions
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Figure 6.
Patent Opinions as a Percentage of Supreme Court Opinions. 107

105

Data tables on file with the Author.

106

Infra Figure 6.

107

Data tables on file with the Author. This compares Supreme Court patent
opinions as shown in Figure 5 against counts of all Supreme Court opinions
from The Supreme Court Database. Spaeth et al., supra note 89.
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Table 1. Percentage of Supreme Court Patent Cases per Decade
Decade
1800-1809
1810-1819
1820-1829
1830-1839
1840-1849
1850-1859
1860-1869
1870-1879
1880-1889
1890-1899
1900-1909
1910-1919
1920-1929
1930-1939
1940-1949
1950-1959
1960-1969
1970-1979
1980-1989
1990-1999
2000-2009
2010-2019

Number of Supreme
Court Cases per Term
135
332
351
445
390
876
961
2128
2697
2450
1909
2242
1897
1521
1308
882
976
1227
1350
864
696
624

Patent Cases
per Term
1
2
5
3
11

38
34
75
150
128
38
51
50
59
50
6
18
12
6
6
13
34

Percentage of
Patent Cases
0.74%
0.60%
1.42%
0.67%
2.82%
4.34%
3.54%
3.52%
5.56%
5.22%
1.99%
2.27%
2.64%
3.88%
3.82%
0.68%
1.84%
0.98%
0.44%
0.69%
1.87%
5.45%
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Percentage of Patent Cases at Supreme Court by Term with 5-Year
Running Average
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Figure 7.
Percentage of Patent Cases at the Supreme Court per Term.
Black line depicts a 5-year running average. Bars are percentages per term.
What was the reason for the lull in the late twentieth century? The most
sudden shift, other than that seen after the change from mandatory to
discretionary jurisdiction, coincided with the passage of the Patent Act of 1952. In
the Patent Act, Congress codified many areas of substantive patent law that had
percolated in the courts and significantly revised numerous substantive patent law
doctrines.108 Indeed, as the Supreme Court has interpreted, one key purpose of the
Patent Act of 1952 was to "substitute statutory precepts for the general judicial
rules that had governed prior to that time," an event that could result in less
Supreme Court patent litigation if codification had the effect of promoting

108

See, e.g., Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 282, 66 Stat. 792, 812 (codifying the
presumption of patent validity); see also P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New
Patent Law, 35 U.S.C.A. 1 (West 1954), reprinted in 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. Soc'Y 161, 166 (1993) ("The patent act of 1952 (this title) stems from two
movements, one to amend the patent laws, and the other to revise and
codify the laws of the United States."). As one key example, the drafters of
the Patent Act of 1952 sought to stabilize the development of the law of
obviousness. H.R. REP. No. 82-1923, at 7 (1952) ("This section should have a
stabilizing effect and minimize great departures which have appeared in
some cases.").
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uniformity and certainty in the law. 109 From the 1950s to 1970s, the Supreme Court
was not heavily involved in development of substantive patent law.110
Interviewees who clerked during the lull from the 1950s to 1970s informed us that
the Court had recently faced criticism of its decisions in other highly technical
areas of law and did not want to venture into patent cases that might require
specialized knowledge or technical expertise to be correctly decided. 111
The most dramatic low in Supreme Court patent opinions, the 1980s, came
with the creation of the Federal Circuit.112 As noted above, some of the key
justifications for creation of the Federal Circuit were to promote certainty,
uniformity of law, and to have more patent appeals decided by judges with
expertise in patent law.m The Supreme Court left the Federal Circuit largely to
this task, taking a fairly hands-off approach from the creation of the Federal Circuit
from 1982 until 1988, when it issued the Christianson114 decision. 115 During that
time, the Supreme Court not only decided very few cases, but its decisions
generally focused on procedural issues. 11 6 This left many substantive patent law
questions to be addressed in the last instance by the Federal Circuit. 117

109

See Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 180 (1980) ("[I]n
its 1952 codification of the patent laws Congress endeavored, at least in part,
to substitute statutory precepts for the general judicial rules that had
governed prior to that time.").

11 0

Interviews by Author.

m

Id.

112

Supra Table 1; Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164,
96 Stat. 25 (1982) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2018)).

m

Supra Section II.C.

11 4

See generally Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800
(1988) (discussing whether the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
would have jurisdiction of the appeal of the final judgment in the case).

115

See Arthur J. Gajarsa & Lawrence P. Cogswell, The Federal Circuit and the
Supreme Court, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 821, 824 (2006) (discussing the Christianson
case, the first patent case the Supreme Court decided "since the creation of
the Federal Circuit six years earlier").

116

Id.

117

Id.
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The frequency of Supreme Court patent opinions began to rise again
following the appointment of Justice Breyer to the Supreme Court in 1994. 118 Prior
scholars have suspected that Justice Breyer had a particular affinity toward
intellectual property law, having written a prominent law review article on
copyright before joining the Court and authoring several opinions in intellectual
property cases during his time on the Court. 119 One example of the increased
attention of the Court to patent issues was the Court's 1995 opinion in Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc., which held that patent claim construction was a legal
issue to be decided by courts, not left to the jury. 120 Another case that epitomized
this time period was Warner-Jenkinson in 1997, where the Court expounded on
patent law's doctrine of equivalents. 121 This was a time when the Supreme Court
began to return to the substance of patent law, issuing opinions, like Markman and
Warner-Jenkinson, that expounded on the nuts-and-bolts of patent law. 122 In 1994,
the Supreme Court issued its first call for the views of the Solicitor General in a
patent case. 123
The increased interest of the Court in patent law since the mid-1990s also
coincided with a period of heightened antitrust scrutiny of technological

118

Duffy, supra note 78, at 524 (recognizing the significant influence of Justice
Breyers tenure on the Supreme Court's review of patent cases).

119

See id. at 524-25.

uo

Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 391 (1996); see also
Gajarsa & Cogswell, supra note 115, at 822 (recognizing Markman as "the
turning point in the history of the Supreme Court's review of Federal Circuit
patent cases").

121

Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17, 17 (1997)
(holding that the doctrine of equivalents is not inconsistent with patent law,
must be applied to individual elements of patent claim, does not require
proof of intent, and is not limited to equivalents disclosed within patent
itself); see also John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as "Prime Percolator": A
Prescription for Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV.
657, 669 (2009) (stating that Warner-Jenkinson is the first Federal Circuit
patent case reviewed by the Supreme Court on questions of substantive
patent law).

122

Golden, supra note 121, at 669 ("[T]he Court's 1997 decision in Warner
Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co. was a watershed. For the first time,
the Court reviewed a Federal Circuit decision on core questions of
substantive patent law ....").

123

Duffy, supra note 78, at 525 (citing Barr Lab'ys v. Burroughs Wellcome Co.,
515 U.S. 1130 (1995) (No. 94-1527)).
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innovations. 124 The viewpoint that patents are monopolistic can affect substantive
patent law in areas such as remedies and equitable doctrines, which often depend
upon considerations of the public interest. 125 The antitrust zeitgeist can also subtly
impact doctrines of validity and infringement. For example, the Court might
support stricter subject matter eligibility doctrines that would result in more
patents being invalid during time periods when the public and the Court view
expansive patents as monopolistic.
Additionally, John Roberts joined as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
on September 29, 2005. 126 The last fifteen years since then have involved high rates
of review on substantive patent law issues. 127 The time period since Roberts's
appointment has also been characterized by increasing tension between the
Federal Circuit's rule-based approach to patent law and the more flexible
approach of the Supreme Court. 12s As discussed further below, many of the
interviewees noted that in the last fifteen years, the Supreme Court has started to
view the Federal Circuit as overly rigid and tending to issue decisions in patent
law that do not align with the Court's historical decisions in other areas of law. 129
Whether justified or not, this narrative has expanded to play an oversized role in

124

See Adi Robertson, How the Antitrust Battles of the '90s Set the Stage for Today's
Tech Giants, THE VERGE (Sept. 6, 2018),
https://www.theverge.com/2018/9/6/17827042/antitrust- l 990s-microsoft
google-aol-monopoly-lawsuits-history
[https://web.archive.org!web/20200902072813/https://www.theverge.com/20
18/9/6/17827042/ anti trust-1990s-microsoft-google-aol-monopoly-lawsui ts
history] (discussing antitrust issues raised against tech giants in the '90s.).

125

See Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942) (discussing
patent misuse as an equitable defense that "forbids the use of the patent to
secure an exclusive right or limited monopoly not granted by the Patent
Office and which it is contrary to public policy to grant."); see generally
Christa J. Laser, Continuing the Conversation of "The Economic Irrationality of
the Patent Misuse Doctrine," 11 CHI.-KENT J. lNTELL. PROP. 104 (2012)
(criticizing patent misuse as an overdeterrent when it applies beyond the
scope of antitrust liability).

126

Press Release, Supreme Court of the United States (Sept. 29, 2005),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/press/pressreleases/pr_09-29-05
[https://perma.cc/69FH-LSZK] (announcing Chief Justice Roberts's
swearing-in ceremony).

127

See supra Figure 4.

128

See, e.g., KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 401-D2 (2007).

129

Interviews by Author; infra Part IV.
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what many view as one reason for the higher number of patent cases at the
Supreme Court today than in the latter part of the twentieth century. 130

IV.

QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION-MAKING
WHEN GRANTING CERTIORARI IN PATENT CASES

A.

METHODOLOGY AND REPORTING OF INTERVIEWS

Despite significant scholarship providing empirical support, no prior
articles have conducted structured, qualitative interviews with those most familiar
with the certiorari process to address the reasons for the rising Supreme Court
patent docket. The Author conducted structured interviews with former clerks of
the Supreme Court and spoke with others involved in the certiorari process.
The interviews involved asking open-ended questions about the clerks'
experiences with certiorari petitions in general cases and patent cases, as well as
the factors that influenced certiorari. The open-ended questions were typically the
following: "Can you tell us about the logistics of cert[iorari] decisions during your
time on the Court and with your Justice?;" "In general cases, what factors were
considered in the certiorari decision?;" and "What considerations were used to
determine certiorari in patent appeals?" Each initial open-ended question was
followed by questions to get more detail on the answer and close out the
participant's answers on that subject, such as why the individual believed that
answer, what they believed the impact of that answer is, and whether there was
anything else on that topic. Participants were then asked their views on the effect,
if any, of particular factors such as solicitor general support, amicus briefs, and
other factors discussed herein. The survey questions were honed over the course
of initial interviews. However, throughout all interviews, attempts were made to
focus on open-ended questions, begin with the most general questions, avoid
leading or confusing questions, and to ask participants the source of their beliefs
and whether there was anything else before moving on to a different topic.
Of the 193 potential participants contacted for interviews, nine completed
the interview process. Interviewees span a wide range of time periods, include
those who clerked for both conservative and liberal justices, and include those who
clerked for Justices in and out of the certiorari pool. Specifically, interviews
included clerks from the following decades: 2010s, 2000s, 1990s, and 1960s.
Participants included former clerks who are currently in private practice or retired,
located in cities across the United States. Participants also included former clerks
with experience in government roles pertinent to the issues in this Article, such as
the solicitor's office. Many interviews were conducted in person, although
130

See infra Part IV.
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telephone interviews were used for participants who lived in other cities than the
Author, for interviews conducted during social distancing efforts to prevent
COVID-19, and as needed for the convenience of the participant.
Ethical and legal obligations to the Court prohibit clerks and Justices from
sharing information about the merits of decision-making on particular cases.131
Therefore, this Article only reports on information regarding the procedure of
certiorari and the factors impacting the reason for granting certiorari as a general
matter in patent cases. Discussion regarding particular cases is the commentary of
the Author and does not reflect information obtained from interviewees. To
protect the privacy of the interviewees, the information reported below is based
on aggregated information from responses to interviews, except where noted.
B.

THE ROLE OF THE SoLICITOR GENERAL

The Office of the Solicitor General's role in cases pending before the
Supreme Court includes both representing the United States before the Court
and-particularly in the last thirty years-participating as an amicus at the
invitation of the Court. 132 The Supreme Court frequently calls for the views of the
Solicitor General in cases where the United States is not a party. 133 The Solicitor
may provide input on the merits of the case, as well as on the determination of
whether to grant a petition for certiorari. 134
131

JUD. CoNF., CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES, Canon 3A(6) (Mar.
12, 2019),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/code_of_conduct_for_united_st
ates_judges_effective_march_12_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/AAB5-23PP]
[hereinafter CODE OF CONDUCT] ("A judge should not make public comment
on the merits of a matter pending or impending in any court. A judge
should require similar restraint by court personnel subject to the judge's
direction and control. The prohibition on public comment on the merits does
not extend to public statements made in the course of the judge's official
duties, to explanations of court procedures, or to scholarly presentations
made for purposes of legal education.").

132

See Seth P. Waxman, Foreword: Does the Solicitor General Matter?, 53 STAN. L.
REV. 1115, 1117-18 (2001).

133

Duffy, supra note 78, at 519 ("At least in the last few decades, the United
States has frequently appeared as an ainicus in the Supreme Court even
when the government is not directly involved in the litigation.") (citing
Thomas Brennan, Lee Epstein & Nancy Staudt, The Political Economy of
Judging, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1503, 1510--11 (2009)).

134

See Kristen A. Norman-Major, The Solicitor General: Executive Policy Agendas
and the Court, 57 ALBANY L. REV. 1081, 1083 (1994); Wade H. McCree Jr., The
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The interviewees inform that the Supreme Court pays particular attention
to the views offered by the Solicitor General, and a call for the views of the Solicitor
General often signifies the importance of a case. The Justices and clerks view the
Solicitor as providing informed and balanced arguments about the issues
presented in a case. 135 Prior empirical scholarship further supports the importance
of the views of the Solicitor General. 136 A grant of certiorari is ten times more likely
where the Court issues a Call for the Views of the Solicitor General, although the
Court might be more likely to issue such a call when it is already considering
granting certiorari. 137 Indeed, the interviewees expressed that the Court is likely to
call for the views of the Solicitor when the Justices want additional time and input
to make the decision of whether to grant certiorari, perhaps when good arguments
exist both in favor of and against certiorari.
The interviewees universally agreed that in patent cases, the views of the
Solicitor hold particular sway with the Court. Without a circuit split to signal the
need for review, and with the technological issues in patent law often exceeding
the Court's day-to-day experiences with complex technology and the nuances of
this sometimes esoteric area of law, the Solicitor is viewed as providing critical
expertise and knowledge. 138 The Solicitor, for example, has been viewed as having
insight into which areas of patent law the Supreme Court should review or
whether a case is an appropriate vehicle for review. 139 The interviewees inform us

Solicitor General and His Client, 59 WASH. U. L.Q. 337, 341 (1981) (discussing
the factors that the Solicitor considered in determining whether to
recommend a grant of certiorari and noting that "it is the duty of the
Solicitor General to serve as a first-line gatekeeper for the Supreme Court").
135

Brennan et al., supra note 133, at 1510-11.

136

Gugliuzza, supra note 6, at 1253.

137

Id.

138

Interviews by Author. See generally Duffy, supra note 78, at 519 (arguing that
the "innovative jurisdictional structure of the [Federal Circuit] has fostered a
unique relationship between the Federal Circuit and the Solicitor General's
Office and has, in a subtle but meaningful way, shifted power over the
development of patent law from the judicial to the executive branch of
government"); id. at 520 ("[T]he interesting question is not whether the
Solicitor General's Office now has significant power to control the
developing path of patent law, but rather whether the Office holds more
power over the long-term trends in the field than does the specialized
appellate court that Congress created to govern the area.").

139

Interviews by Author. See generally Oral Argument at 47-48, Bilski v.
Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2009) (No. 08-964) (In oral argument in this patent case
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that the Court views the Solicitor as representing an important institutional
interest of the federal government in patent law. 140
These qualitative results are also in alignment with empirical research. In
an empirical study of certiorari decisions in patent cases, Professor Paul Gugliuzza
found that in patent cases from the 2002 to 2016 Terms, the Supreme Court agreed
with the Solicitor General's recommendation on certiorari 93.3% of the time-or
in in 28 of the 30 cases. 141 In contrast, over all case types, the Supreme Court agreed
with the recommendation of the Solicitor General to grant or deny certiorari 78.9%
of the time. 142 Professor Gugliuzza's empirical work also indicates that the Solicitor
General more frequently recommends a grant of certiorari in patent cases (43.3%
of the time) than in all cases overall (27.2%). 143
C.

THE ROLE OF AMICI

Professor Gugliuzza's empirical data likewise support a significant role of
amici in patent cases. His study showed that in patent cases, a petition is nearly
four times more likely to be granted if two to four amicus briefs are filed versus
one, and 12.6 times more likely to be granted if five or more amicus briefs are filed
at the certiorari stage versus one. 144 Although amicus support is generally helpful
for both patent and non-patent cases, the effect of amicus support on the likelihood
that certiorari is granted is more pronounced in patent cases. Professor Gugliuzza
reported that across all cases (including non-patent cases), a petition is not much
more likely to be granted if two to four amicus briefs are filed instead of only
one.14s

regarding subject matter eligibility, the Solicitor noted, "we opposed cert in
this case because we recognized that there are difficult problems out there in
terms of patentability of software innovations and medical diagnostic-"
Justice Kennedy interrupted, "You thought we'd mess it up." As the
audience laughed, the Solicitor diplomatically explained, "We thought that
this case would provide an unsuitable vehicle for resolving the hard
questions ....").
140

Interviews by Author.

141

Gugliuzza, supra note 6, at 1234.

142 Id. at 1256.
143

Id. at 1258.

144

Id. at 1253.

145

Id. at 1252.
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The interviews confirmed that amici play a particularly important role in
patent cases. Again, with no circuit split to signal the importance and ripeness of
a legal issue, the number, identity, and substantive positions of amici hold
particular sway. The interviewees noted that amicus briefs were generally more
important at the certiorari stage than the merits. In particular, amicus briefs that
indicated that the decision would have a broad impact on an entire industry, rather
than just the parties in suit, increased the perceived need for certiorari. 146 The
merits of the position advocated by the amici were less important than the window
the amicus briefs provided the Court into how the decision might affect different
interests. 147 For example, if many amicus briefs were filed from a variety of
companies across many sectors of the economy, it could signal that the issue at
hand could be important. 148 Although different chambers have different views of
which types of amici are most persuasive, many viewed briefs from groups
perceived as neutral, such as academics, the American Intellectual Property Law
Association("AIPLA"), and other bar associations as especially noteworthy when
considering whether to grant certiorari. 149 The Author understands from the
interviewees, however, that the signaling value of amicus briefs has decreased
slightly in recent years as more and more cases come to the Court with amicus
support for certiorari.ISO
0.

THE NARRATNE OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT AS DEFIANT AND
PROMOTING PATENT EXCEPTIONALISM

Some of the interviewees said that in the decades since its formation, the
Federal Circuit has developed a reputation at the Supreme Court for favoring rules
over flexible standards, and for disregarding Supreme Court precedent instructing
for more flexible approaches. 1s1 Supporting this view, some scholars have urged
that the Supreme Court is more likely to act on certiorari in patent cases where
there is a narrative that the Federal Circuit has issued a decision in patent law that
conflicts with Supreme Court precedent in other areas of law. 1s2 This scholarship
146

Interviews by Author.

147

Id.

148

Id.

149

Id.

150

Id.

151

Id.

152

Tejas N. Narechania, Certiorari, Universality, and a Patent Puzzle, 116 MICH. L.
REV. 1345, 1348 (2018).

2020

Certiorari in Patent Cases

603

suggests that "consistency across substantive fields of law[] is an important (but
unstated) priority in certiorari decision-making." 153 The interviewees noted that
although this narrative did not exist immediately after the creation of the Federal
Circuit, it is prevalent today and has been prevalent in the past decade.
Recognizing this, present Supreme Court advocates have learned to highlight
when their case fits within this preexisting narrative. 154
Of course, the negativity of this narrative might not be fair. As an initial
matter of logical deduction, when the Supreme Court accepts an appeal from a
regional circuit on the basis of an even circuit split, half of the regional circuits that
had decided the issue will have taken a position that matches the Supreme Court's
ultimate outcome. In contrast, when the Supreme Court accepts appeals from the
Federal Circuit, which has exclusive jurisdiction and therefore typically no circuit
splits, the correction of perceived errors becomes relatively more central.
Therefore, the Federal Circuit's approach is perhaps less likely to match the
ultimate decision of the Supreme Court than this more average rate for regional
circuits. Moreover, the Federal Circuit's mandate to unify and normalize patent
law155 might naturally yield more rigid approaches-laws from which investors
and patent stakeholders can more accurately determine the value of their
investments and risk of their product launches. If the Supreme Court does not
similarly view its purpose in patent cases as promoting uniformity and stability of
law, its approach will differ.

153

Id. at 1345; see also id. at 1349 (citing Robin Feldman, Ending Patent
Exceptionalism and Structuring the Rule of Reason: The Supreme Court Opens the
Door for Both, 15 MINN. J.L. So. & TECH. 61, (2014); Peter Lee, The Supreme
Assimilation of Patent Law, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1413, 1453-61 (2016);
Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Deference and Patent Exceptionalism, 65 DUKE
L.J. ONLINE 149, (2016),
https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=l
&article=1017&context=dlj_online [https://perma.cc/Q258-KF24]; Paul R.
Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a Federal Court, 54 WM. & MARYL. REV. 1791,
1817-18 (2013). But cf James Donald Smith, Patent Exceptionalism with
Presidential Advice and Consent, 65 DUKE L.J. 1551, 1552-53 (2016) (praising
the PTAB's review process for patents and advocating that President
Lincoln's "engagement with the patent system also contributes to the notion
of a patent-system exceptionalism that always has existed and still is in
evidence today, as can be seen in the existence and relevance of the PTAB").

154
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THE EMERGING SUPREME COURT BAR

E.

The interviewees inform us that cases arising from the Federal Circuit
often have well-written, paid petitions that lay out the issues for review in a way
that highlights their cert-worthiness. Empirical work has shown that in recent
patent cases, a petition for certiorari was three times more likely to be granted if it
was filed by one of a small group of highly experienced Supreme Court advocates
that the study termed the"elite advocates" of the Supreme Court bar. 156 These elite
lawyers represented clients in 16% of total certiorari petitions from 2002 to 2016,
but 40% of the petitions that the Supreme Court granted. 157
Although the interviewees confirmed the importance of experienced
Supreme Court advocates in patent petitions, the reasons were not entirely aligned
with those suggested by prior scholarship. 158 The interviews indicated that
petitions crafted by experienced advocates presented the questions in a manner
that focused the interest of the Court. Petitions by these advocates demonstrated
the importance of the questions presented by the certiorari petition, such as
making clear that the answer would impact the viability of an industry. They
showed how the case fits into the concerns that the Supreme Court has had with
the Federal Circuit's jurisprudence. Moreover, they framed the case as an ideal
vessel to decide the legal issue presented, such as by making the technology
appear simple and the procedural posture seem clear. As the interviewees
explained, elite advocates were also better at the key task of marshalling the
support of numerous and influential amici and the Solicitor General's office.
Contrary to prior scholarship, almost all of the interviewees urged that it was not
the identity of the advocate that increased the likelihood of grant, but the skill the
advocate brought to the most important components of the certiorari process and
in presenting the questions submitted by the petition. One interviewee stated,
however, that clerks do recognize the names of leading advocates as a signal that

156

1s7

158

Gugliuzza, supra note 6, at 1236. "Elite Supreme Court advocates" were
defined in this study as "lawyers who have presented oral argument in five
or more Supreme Court cases in the preceding ten years." Id.

Id.

Cf id. (suggesting a number of theories that align with those noted by
interviewees here, such as the ability of elite advocates to marshal
government and amicus support, but also hypothesizing that clerks might
recognize the names of frequently-appearing advocates, that parties with
cases more likely to obtain certiorari might be more likely to hire elite
advocates, or that elite advocates are more likely to accept a case that is
likely to be granted certiorari).
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the petition will be well-written and at least non-frivolous, noting that although
leading advocates will stretch and reach to fully represent their clients, leading
advocates "don't waste their time writing frivolous petitions."
F.

TECHNOLOGICAL COMPLEXITY

The Author understands from the interviewees that in trying to determine
whether a particular case is the best vehicle to decide a legal issue, clerks often
consider whether the facts are amenable to a straightforward decision. In
particular, the interviewees indicated that in patent cases, clerks pay attention to
the technical complexity of a case, avoiding cases with particularly complicated
technology even if as a legal matter they present a fairly clean question to the
Court. 159 The Court will often prefer to let issues about a new technology percolate
longer in the lower courts. 160 If it does accept certiorari, the Court often relies
heavily on the views of the Solicitor General in complex patent cases for technical
guidance. 161
The Supreme Court does not have the same institutional and technological
expertise as the Federal Circuit. For example, although Federal Circuit judges
frequently have at least one clerk in each of their chambers with an advanced
degree in a STEM (science, technology, engineering, or mathematics) field, the
interviewees stated that there has been little impetus at the Supreme Court to hire
clerks with either a technical degree or experience in patent law. 162 Very few clerks
have been hired to the Court from the Federal Circuit. 163 Moreover, no Supreme
Court Justice has a scientific degree. 164 In contrast, multiple Federal Circuit judges
have at least undergraduate degrees and a number have advanced degrees in
STEM fields. 165
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Interviews by Author.
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Id.
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Id.

162

Id.
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Id.

164

See Current Members, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S.,
https://www.suprernecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx
[https://perrna.cc/6WWL-9H9D] (last visited Nov. 6, 2020) (noting that each
Justice has only a B.A. or A.B. degree, not a Bachelor's of Science).
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E.g., Alan D. Lourie, Circuit Judge, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIR.,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/alan-d-lourie-circuit-judge
[https://perrna.cc/WX25-P63V] (last visited Sept. 9, 2020) (noting, for
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The technology knowledge of the judges on the Federal Circuit and their
clerks allows them to understand complex technologies and the impact of their
decisions on the scientific community. The interviewees generally agreed that the
Supreme Court would be better served in patent and other technical cases by
having more clerks with technical backgrounds or a Justice with technology
experience. However, a number of the interviewees urged that patent cases remain
a small enough percentage of the Court's docket that expertise in other areas of
law, such as constitutional law and criminal law, remain a higher priority.166

G.

IMPoRTANCE OF THE DECISION

The interviewees emphasized that in patent cases, where, again, no circuit
split signals the importance and ripeness of a legal issue, clerks and Justices
attempt to use other proxies for the importance of the case. In certain patent cases,
the interviewees noted, the briefing of parties and amid often makes clear that the
outcome of the case would have lasting impact throughout an industry or, in some
cases, determine the viability of that industry. However, the interviewees did not
believe that the Court frequently considers the impact of taking a patent case on
the public interest. Even then, what would be in the public interest in patent cases
is often unknown to those unfamiliar with patent law. One hypothesis of the
author (which does not originate from interviewees) is that although patent
stakeholders view certainty and stability of the law as more important than its
contents in most cases, the Supreme Court might focus instead on the interest of
the consuming public to have unrestrained access to technology-in a sense
viewing patents as a monopolistic restraint on trade rather than an incentive for
innovation. On the issue of certainty, the interviewees who had comments on this
issue stated that the effect of a Supreme Court decision on the certainty and
stability of patent law was not a factor that clerks frequently considered or wrote
about in their certiorari memos.

H.

PROXIES FOR CIRCUIT SPLITS? FEDERAL CIRCUIT DISSENTS AND EN
BANC DECISIONS

With no circuit splits, 167 it can be tempting to assume that the Court will
look to other close potential proxies for circuit splits to assess the need for review.
example, that Judge Lourie has a Ph.D. in chemistry from University of
Pennsylvania).
166
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The rare exception is splits between the Federal Circuit and pre-Federal
Circuit law from a regional circuit court. E.g., Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc.,
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Proxies for circuit splits at the Federal Circuit could include split en bane decisions
or dissents from denials of en bane review. 168 However, the interviews did not
indicate that Justices or clerks view split Federal Circuit opinions or split denials
of en bane review as a prerequisite to review or as having importance equivalent
to a circuit split. Nor would doing so provide the best indication of the patent cases
in need of review.
For appeals arising from regional circuit courts, the circuit split is
generally considered a prerequisite to review in all but a handful of cases. 169 The
tendency to deny review for regional circuit court appeals not presenting a circuit
split is so strong that one of the interviewees who was a former clerk noted seeing
other clerks sometimes mistakenly write "deny-no circuit split" on the cover of
petitions for appeal from the Federal Circuit. Other more recent interviewees,
however, stated that clerks were well aware that the Federal Circuit is a court of
exclusive jurisdiction and would not make this mistake. In appeals from the
Federal Circuit, the interviewees indicated, some Justices will occasionally
consider the substance of dissents, dissents from en bane opinions, or dissents from
denial of en bane review on the merits, particularly when that dissent is written by
a judge whom the Justice has come to view as intellectually or ideologically
similar.
The Author has not, however, heard reports from the interviewees that
the Justices or clerks consider the mere fact that the Federal Circuit decision was
split a significant factor in granting certiorari. Rather, in appeals arising from the
Federal Circuit, the interviewees noted that clerks and Justices focus on other
factors affecting whether the case merits review. Indeed, with regularity, the
Supreme Court grants certiorari despite the appeal arising from a unanimous or
near-unanimous Federal Circuit decision.17° As discussed in more detail above, the
most important considerations for the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in
patent cases are the following: the importance of the case, whether the Solicitor
525 U.S. 55, 60 (1998) (citing Timely Prods. Corp. v. Arron, 523 F.2d 288, 299
302 (2d Cir. 1975)). These kinds of splits might be less urgent to resolve
because they are not a "live" split between two courts that might decide
future cases in different ways absent Supreme Court intervention.
16s

Supra Section II.C.

169

Interviews by Author.

170

See Golden, supra note 121, at 658-59 (citing Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG
Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008); KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398
(2007); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006)) (discussing
cases where a unanimous Supreme Court struck down decisions of a
unanimous Federal Circuit).
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General or certain trusted amid urge and set forward a persuasive basis for
review, the rigidity of the rule proposed by the Federal Circuit below (and thus
whether the case fits into the prevailing narrative about the Federal Circuit), and
whether a majority of Justices believe that the Federal Circuit decision below is in
need of correction.171
The different treatment of the considerations for review in patent cases
versus appeals arising from the regional circuit courts may be entirely appropriate.
In appeals arising from regional circuit courts, one of the key roles of the Supreme
Court is to provide national uniformity of law where there are significant regional
differences. However, in patent law, it is the Federal Circuit itself that corrects for
any national disuniformity because it is a court of exclusive jurisdiction. 172 In
patent cases, where appeals are taken from a court with exclusive jurisdiction and
extensive experience in the area of law on which it is opining, the ideal role of the
Supreme Court instead may be to correct for the types of errors that arise from a
court with exclusive jurisdiction. For example: "ossification of legal doctrine,"173
failure to appropriately consider analogous standards from other areas of law or
other courts, 174 or the overlooking or misapplication of historical precedent from
the Supreme Court. 175 When viewed from this lens of the need to correct the types
of error most commonly arising from a court of exclusive jurisdiction, it is not
surprising that a proxy for a circuit split would be an unimportant factor in review.

171

Supra Sections N.B-0.

m

Supra Section II.C.

173

Golden, supra note 121, at 662. ("The Court's primary role in this area should
be to combat undesirable ossification of legal doctrine. Consequently, the
Court should generally confine its review of substantive patent law to
situations where there is a substantial risk that Federal Circuit precedent has
frozen legal doctrine either too quickly or for too long. Further, the Court's
decisions in this area should typically be modest, seeking to spur, rather
than foreclose, subsequent legal development.").

174

See Narechania, supra note 7, at 1348 (stating that the Supreme Court has
appeared to consider analogous standards from other areas of law).

175

Christa J. Laser, Equitable Defenses in Patent Law, 75 U. MIAMI L. REV.
(forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 2-3), (available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3686120) (exploring the
Supreme Court's historical approach to equitable defenses such as misuse,
unclean hands, estoppel, and laches).
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THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGICAL AGREEMENT

Some scholars urge that the reason the Supreme Court has heard fewer
cases as a general matter in recent years is in part due to increasing ideological
divisions at the Court that make it more difficult to summon a majority in
controversial cases.176 Other commentators disagree that ideological differences
have had much impact on the cases taken by the Court, stating that the Supreme
Court hears fewer cases today in large part because modem justices simply vote
to hear cases less often than their predecessors and because fewer petitions are
filed by the Govemment. 177 However, if ideological divisions have impacted the
number of cases the Court takes, this could provide a residual explanation for the
increasing percentage of patent cases before the Court.
The Author understands from the interviewees that patent law is
sometimes viewed as a less politically divisive topic than other areas of the law,
such as civil rights and constitutional law. Indeed, dozens of patent cases in recent
years have resulted in unanimous or near-unanimous opinions. 178 The
interviewees who clerked in recent decades emphasize a sense that patent cases
are cases where a majority consensus will be easy to gather, regardless of which
Justice writes the opinion of the Court. This suggests that one possible reason why
176

Owens & Simon, supra note 90, at 1264 (illustrating the effects of ideological
dispersion amongst Supreme Court Justices).

177

Liptak, supra note 34, at 1-2 (reporting that Justices Souter, Thomas, and
Ginsburg voted to hear cases less often than their predecessors).

178

E.g., Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664, 1678 (2017) (Breyer, J.,
concurring); TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands, 137 S. Ct. 1514,
1514 (2017) (resulting in a unanimous opinion); Life Tech. Corp. v. Promega
Corp., 137 S. Ct. 734, 735 (2017) (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgement); Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429, 429
(2016) (resulting in a unanimous opinion); Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee,
136 S. Ct. 2131, 2148-56 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring; Alito, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct.
1923, 1936--38 (2016) (Breyer, J., concurring); Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l,
573 U.S. 208, 227 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig
Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 900 (2014) (resulting in a unanimous
opinion); Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs. Inc., 572 U.S. 915, 916
(2014) (resulting in a unanimous opinion); Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health
Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 572 U.S. 1744, 1744 (2014) (resulting in a unanimous
opinion); Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545, 546
(2014) (resulting in a unanimous opinion); Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski
Family Ventures, LLC, 571U.S.191, 193 (2014) (resulting in a unanimous
opinion).
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the Court hears more patent cases today is not because of increased interest in
patent cases, but because patent cases are viewed as non-ideological in a time of
increased ideological division. In other words, perhaps the Supreme Court hears
more patent cases today as a percentage of its overall docket in part because patent
cases do not cause the same ideological hold-ups to certiorari seen in other areas
of the law. 179
V.

DISCUSSION OF THE IMPACT OF THE SUPREME COURT'S CURRENT
APPROAOI TO CERTIORARI IN PATENT CASES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR THE FUTURE

The Supreme Court, by all appearances, has granted certiorari in a number
of patent cases without considering whether granting certiorari in that case will
help or hinder the stability and uniformity of patent law. 1so Stability of the law is
critically important, but particularly in patent law, where investment in entire
industries can sometimes depend upon changes in the law made by the Supreme
Court. Given the unique societal and procedural background of patent cases, the
Supreme Court cannot simply consider the same balance of factors it applies in
other cases when granting certiorari in a patent case. 181 Instead, given the
incredible public policy interests in the stability and certainty of patent law, the
Supreme Court in patent cases should consider whether the Court serves the
public interest by intervening, particularly whether the grant of certiorari will
promote or undermine stability of the law.
The Supreme Court was not formed for the mere purpose of correcting
perceived legal error by the inferior courts. As the Supreme Court stated in the
1920s, "The jurisdiction was not conferred upon this Court merely to give the
defeated party in the Circuit Court of Appeals another hearing." 182 Chief Justice
Vinson also noted, "The Supreme Court is not, and never has been, primarily
concerned with the correction of errors in lower court decisions." 183 Rather, the
original purpose of the Supreme Court was to unify and reduce uncertainty in the
law and clarify issues of great public importance. "The debates in the
Constitutional Convention make clear that the purpose of the establishment of one
179

Interviews by Author (noting that areas such as civil rights, constitutional
law, and criminal law are often more divisive).

180

See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 609 (2010) (finding that a business
method for hedging investments is not patent-eligible).

1s1

See supra Section Il.B.

182

Magnum Import Co. v. Coty, 262 U.S. 159, 163 (1923).

183

Fred M. Vinson, Work of the U.S. Supreme Court, 12 TEX. B.J. 551, 551 (1949).
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supreme national tribunal was, in the words of John Rutledge of South Carolina,
'to secure the national rights & uniformity of Judgmts [sic]."' 184 Indeed, the
Supreme Court itself stated that it has two main purposes: "first to secure
uniformity of decision between those courts in the nine circuits, and second, to
bring up cases involving questions of importance which it is in the public interest
to have decided by this Court of last resort." 185 It is notable that the tension which
arises between the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit may derive from the
concept that the Federal Court is the only other court that has national jurisdiction
aside from the Supreme Court. 186
As discussed above, the Federal Circuit was formed in part based on a
desire to unify and nationalize patent law and develop a court of specialized
expertise. 187 The problems identified in the Hruska Commission that spurred the
creation of the Federal Circuit, such as the inability of the Supreme Court to take
a sufficient number of cases to keep up with the need for nationally binding
judgments on issues of patent law, 188 have been remedied at least in part by the
consolidation of patent cases to the Federal Circuit. The Supreme Court in patent
cases, then, should look to the second component of its charge: the public interest
in accepting the case. Rule 10 includes a consideration, whether a case "should be[]
settled by this Court," 189 which would support such an analysis.
The certainty and uniformity of law is critically important in patent cases
and perhaps is the most significant public interest consideration that could be
184

See id at 551-76 (explaining, generally, the purpose of the Supreme Court).

185

Magnum Import, 262 U.S. at 163.

186

Supra Section II.C.

187

Supra Section II.C; See Dreyfuss, supra note 58, at 7-8 (explaining the
solutions offered by and resulting from formation of the Federal Circuit).

l88

See CoMM'N ON REVISION OF THE FED. CT. APP. SYS., supra note 58, at 152-53
(quoting a letter form Professor Gambrell and Mr. Dunner, stating, "It is our
view that the principal cause of circuit-to-circuit deviations in the patent
field stems from a lack of guidance and monitoring by a single court whose
Judgments are nationally binding. True, the Supreme Court technically fills
this role but in practice it has not and, indeed, it cannot. The few decisions it
renders in critical patent law areas, e.g., obviousness, have done little to
provide the circuit courts with meaningful guidance. The Supreme Court is
just too busy to perform anything even resembling a monitoring function on
patent-related issues."); Dreyfuss, supra note 58, at 6 (noting that the
formation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit resulted from
proposals made by the Hruska Commission).

189

SUP.

CT. R. 10.

612

AJPLAQ.J.

Vol. 48:4

applied to certiorari in patent cases. Without clear and stable patent laws, investors
in patented technology and those who practice technologies accused of
infringement cannot accurately determine the scope of their rights. When an
investment carries significant uncertainty, its value is depleted. 190 When a product
being developed faces unpredictable risk that it will face injunctions and damages
for patent infringement, this decreases companies' willingness to cornrnercialize. 191
Uncertainty is the bane of technology markets. 192 In patent law, the certainty of the
law perhaps should be the most important factor in the Supreme Court's test,
balancing all of the circumstances.
The Supreme Court might need to correct errors where there is ossification
of an incorrect standard. However, the interests of the public are not served where
the Supreme Court serves merely to second guess the "rigid" approach of the
Federal Circuit. 193 Certiorari in patent cases should not be granted merely because
the Federal Circuit standard differs from the approach the Supreme Court believes
is appropriate and the case presents a clean vehicle to overturn it. Businesses and
other patent stakeholders need to trust that the decisions of the Federal Circuit will
generally remain intact absent significant legal error. The current rate of Supreme
Court review194 undermines this confidence.
Moreover, despite increasing its patent docket, the Supreme Court has not
matched the Federal Circuit's institutional expertise on issues of patent law or
capacity for evaluating technologically complex scientific issues. 195 It is, of course,
true that there are certain issues that arise in patent law where the Supreme Court
can claim to have at least as much or more pertinent expertise and authority than
the Federal Circuit, such as on issues of the constitutionality of provisions of the
patent code 1% or questions that also arise in other areas of law such as the

190

See Czarnitzki & Toole, supra note 14, at 147 (noting the relationship between
uncertainty and value).

191

See id. at 157 (stating that "higher levels of uncertainty reduce current R&D
investment, with a non-patenting firm in the German manufacturing sector
reducing R&D investment by 23% in response to a 10% increase in
uncertainty from the median").

192

See id. at 148 (suggesting a "negative relationship between the current level
of R&D investment and uncertainty").

193

See supra Section IV.D.

194

See supra Figure 4; see also Madigan & Mossoff, supra note 12, at 946-47.

195

See supra Section IV.F.

I%

E.g., Oil States Energy Ser., LLC v. Greene's Energy Grp., 138 S. Ct. 1365,
1379 (2018) (finding that administrative inter partes review of patents by the
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applicability of laches to bar damages when a statute of limitations applies. 197 But
in other areas of patent law, scholars routinely criticize the Supreme Court's recent
decisions for failing to act with awareness of the impact of its decisions on industry
and the stability of the patent system. 198
For example, a number of patent stakeholders have urged that the
Supreme Court's decisions since 2010 on patent eligible subject matter doctrine
(which determines what types of technologies can be patented), caused sweeping
change to the scope of patent rights as they were previously understood. 199 In the
last decade, the Supreme Court held innovations in numerous technology areas
ineligible for patenting, including certain business methods, medical treatments
and diagnostics, and too-abstract software-rendering significant investments in
these types of technologies unrecoverable. 200 Some have characterized the
patent office is not unconstitutional and does not violate the Seventh
Amendment right to jury).
197

See SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 137
S. Ct. 954, 967 (2017) (holding that laches does not bar damages for patent
infringement actions brought within the statute of limitations set out in the
patent code).

198

See Madigan & Mossoff, supra note 12, at 941-42 (reporting that that from
2014 to 2017, a time period following various Supreme Court decisions on
patent eligible subject matter, 1694 patent applications on technologies such
as diagnostic tests, ultrasound imaging, and other medical devices were
denied at the U.S. patent office for failing to be patent eligible, yet foreign
counterparts were granted).

199

KEVIN J. HICKEY, CONG. RsCH. SERV., R45918, PATENT-ELIGIBLE SUBJECT
(2019)
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45918.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2AW-NXTQ]
("These cases have been widely recognized to effect a significant change in
the scope of patentable subject matter, restricting the sorts of inventions that
are patentable in the United States."); USPTO, PATENT ELIGIBLE SUBJECT
MATIER: REPORT ON VIEWS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE PUBLIC 23
(2017), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/101
Report_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7WW-WJRJ] ("In general,
commentators agreed that the Court decisions in Bilski, Mayo, Myriad, and
Alice have had a significant impact on the scope of patent eligible subject
matter."); Jeffrey A. Lefstin et al., Final Report of the Berkeley Center for Law &
Technology Section 101 Workshap: Addressing Patent Eligibility Challenges, 33
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 551, 555 (2018).
MATIER REFORM IN THE 116TH CONGRESS 2

200

Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 573 U.S. 208, 226 (2014) (finding that a
software program related to financial transactions was not eligible for
patenting); Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S.
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Supreme Court's patent eligible subject matter jurisprudence as "subjective,"
"indeterminate," and "highly unpredictable." 201 Others argue that the Supreme
Court's approach to patent eligible subject matter "lacks administrability'' 202 or has
undermined the United States' status as possessing the "gold standard" of patent
systems. 203 The Author does not take a position that the Supreme Court's decisions
were wrong as a legal matter. Indeed, finding patents on certain core technologies,
abstractions, and natural phenomenon ineligible for patenting could help to
promote innovation by weeding out patents that if granted, would threaten basic
research and development.
But regardless of which position is a more correct legal interpretation or
better policy, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence has had an impact on the law in
the lower courts. Empirical evidence shows the dramatic change: in 2010, when
the Supreme Court decided Bilski,204 only two patent cases were terminated at the
trial level based on a determination that the patents covered ineligible subject
matter; in 2019, the most common reason for a patent to be found invalid was
ineligible subject matter, with 57 lower court cases finding patents invalid on this
basis. 205 This change has a significant impact on investments. Some patents that
were by all appearances valid when written are no longer valid, when in many
cases businesses spent millions of dollars investing in reliance on the belief of
patent protection.206 Indeed, legislative history of the America Invents Act
suggests that one impetus for the implementation of Covered Business Method
Review, an administrative review proceeding for business method patents at the

576, 591 (2013) (holding that isolated DNA for medical use not is patent
eligible); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 73
(2012) (finding that a test to aid autoimmune disease treatment is not patent
eligible); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 609 (2010) (finding that a business
method for hedging investments is not patent-eligible).
201

Hon. Paul R. Michel, The Supreme Court Saps Patent Certainty, 82 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1751, 1758 (2014).

202

David 0. Taylor, Confusing Patent Eligibility, 84 TENN. L. REV. 157, 160 (2016).

203

Madigan & Mossoff, supra note 12, at 940.

204

Bilski, 561 U.S. at 593.

205

GENEVA CLARK, LEX MACHINA, p ATENT LmGATION REPORT 23-24 (Rachel
Bailey & Jason Maples eds., 2020).

206

See Madigan & Mossoff, supra note 12, at 950.
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patent office, was to invalidate patents that were no longer patentable after
Supreme Court decisions on subject matter eligibility. 207
Even if the criticisms that the Supreme Court's patent decisions have
undermined the stability of law are true, this result could not have been avoided
because the Supreme Court's current approach to certiorari in patent cases under
Rule 10208 does not adequately take into account the effect of the Court's decisions
on the stability and certainty of law. This was not always the case; the interviewees
inform that in the mid-twentieth century, the Court often tried to avoid
intervention in patent law where it lacked legal expertise on a nuanced issue of
substantive law. Moreover, the current approach is not how patent certiorari
should be determined. It is not in the interest of innovation in this country to have
an unstable, unpredictable patent law. 2w
The Supreme Court precedent has noted a dual purpose of certiorari: first,
nationalizing and unifying the law, and "second, to bring up cases involving
questions of importance which it is in the public interest to have decided by this
Court of last resort." 210 The Supreme Court's call in patent law is not to duplicate
that function or to merely correct errors. 211 There is no procedural proxy in patent
law that completely matches the signaling function of the circuit split to indicate

207

See 157 CONG. REC. 9791 (2011) (statement of Rep. Smith) ("It is likely that
most if not all the business method patents that were issued after State Street
are now invalid under Bilski. There is no sense in allowing expensive
litigation over patents that are no longer valid.").

208

See supra Section II.B.

209

The Supreme Court should also consider the impact of the antitrust zeitgeist
on patent law. As discussed above, there can be a tendency for the Court to
tighten patent law such that more patents would be invalid or unenforceable
during time periods of heightened antitrust enforcement. Antitrust scrutiny
has continued to rise from the 2000s to the present day and might soon reach
levels like that seen in the early twentieth century. See, e.g., Kari Paul, Google
Is Facing the Biggest Antitrust Case in a Generation. What Could Happen?, THE
GUARDIAN (Oct. 21, 2020, 4:57 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/oct/21/google-antitrust
charges-what-is-next [https://perrna.cc/F7XN-MVGD]. Given the value of
certainty in patent law, the Court should resist the urge to change patent
laws as inconsistent with the present zeitgeist, favoring instead more
consistent and predictable standards that promote business investment.

210

Magnum Import Co. v. Coty, 262 U.S. 159, 163 (1923).

211

See id. (recognizing that certiorari serves a function beyond just providing
another hearing for the parties).

616

AIPLAQ.J.

Vol. 48:4

the need for Supreme Court review. 212 Absent this, the Court must consider the
public interest at the forefront of its certiorari decision in patent cases. Because of
the significant investments that require knowing the boundaries of patent rights,
the public interest of certiorari in a patent case should include consideration of
how the case will impact the stability and certainty of law.
The Supreme Court can-and, to avoid future crises, must-change its
approach to certiorari in patent cases. Given the unique societal and procedural
background of patent cases, the Supreme Court must apply Rule 10 differently in
patent cases than in general cases. In a patent case, the Supreme Court should
consider whether the Court serves the public interest by intervening, including
most importantly whether a grant of certiorari will promote or undermine stability
of patent law. The benefits of stability will then need to be weighed against the
interest of correction of legal error.

VI.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has decided more patent cases in the past decade than
the prior three decades combined. A number of scholars and patent stakeholders
urge that the Supreme Court's frequent decisions are destabilizing the law,
undermining the United States' position as a leader in innovation. Yet no
scholarship to date has used qualitative data to investigate why the Supreme
Court's patent docket is increasing and what factors the Supreme Court considers
in its review of patent cases.
Without a circuit split to ascertain whether a petition is worthy of review,
the Supreme Court must look to other factors in patent cases. The interviews
confirm the teachings of prior scholarship that the views of the Solicitor General
and the number, type, and focus of amicus support play an outsized role in patent
cases. However, the interviews contradicted other views from prior scholarship,
such as familiar names of top Supreme Court advocates spurring certiorari in
patents cases. As to why cases filed by these advocates have a higher rate of
success, it appears that such advocates are simply more skilled at preparing
petitions that address the considerations most important to the Court.
The research presented in this Article also suggests that the narrative of
the Federal Circuit as applying rigid rules rather than flexible standards urged by
the Supreme Court is pervasive at the Court. The interviewees also suggest that
patent cases are viewed as ideologically safe choices, which the Author
212

As noted above, splits en bane in decisions or dissents from denial of en bane
review might have some signaling value, but the interviewees indicate that
they do not remotely approach the weight of a circuit split in signaling the
need for the Court's review.
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hypothesizes might be partially responsible for the increase in the Supreme
Court's percentage of patent cases in recent years of ideological division.
There is, however, a key factor that the Supreme Court is not considering
in patent cases when it grants certiorari: whether a decision in the case will support
or undermine the stability and certainty of patent law. Stability is critically
important where industries and investments can be diminished by changes in the
law made by the Supreme Court. Rule 10 permits the Court to consider whether a
case "should be[] settled by [the] Court," but the public policy of patents is not
being fully appreciated in modem Supreme Court certiorari decisions. Where the
Federal Circuit already provides uniform national appellate decisions on patent
law, the Supreme Court should consider more than merely the ordinary Rule 10
factors when granting certiorari in a patent case. The Court should consider
whether the grant of certiorari will be in the best interest of the public, which in
patent cases requires consideration of whether the decision will promote or
undermine stability of patent law.

VII.

APPENDIX: EXAMPLE SURVEY QUESTIONS

Note: although the same numbered open-ended questions were asked of
each participant, follow-up questions varied based on the participant's initial
responses. Follow-up questions were honed over the course of initial interviews,
with the subject matter and style of questioning remaining the same.

Logistics of Certiorari.
1. Can you tell me about the logistics of cert decisions during your time on
Court and with your Justice?
a. Are you aware of which Justices participated in the certiorari pool
during your time on the Court? [If yes] Who?
i. [If Justice participated in the pool]
1. How were petitions divided among chambers?
2. What were the contents of a pool memo? How
detailed were the memos? Did that differ from
case to case? [If yes] How?
3. Was a pool memo written for every petition?
4. How were certiorari memos written by other
chambers reviewed? Did clerks in [Justice's]
chambers add their own written comments and
suggestions for the Justice on the certiorari
memo?
5. Are you aware of what else the Justice reviewed
beyond the certiorari memo? [If yes] What else?
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Did what the Justice reviewed differ depending
on the grant/deny recommendation or from case
to case? [If yes] How?
ii. [If Justice did not participate in the pool]
1. What were the logistics of certiorari analyses in
your Justice's chambers? Did clerks write a memo
with a recommendation?
2. How detailed were the memos? Did that differ
from case to case? [If yes] How?
3. Was a memo written for every petition?
4. Are you aware of what else the Justice reviewed
beyond the certiorari memo? [If yes] What else?
Did what the Justice reviewed differ depending
on the grant/deny recommendation or from case
to case? [If yes] How?
Are you aware of how the certiorari discussion list process
worked from your time on the court? [If yes] How did it work?

Certiorari Considerations in General Cases
2. In general cases, what factors were considered in the certiorari decision?
a. Supreme Court Rule 10 provides several considerations for
certiorari, including circuit split, conflict with Supreme Court
precedent, important but unsettled question of law.
i. What was the effect, if any, of split?
u. What was the effect, if any, of conflicts with prior
Supreme Court precedent?
iii. What was the effect, if any, of important unsettled
questions of law? What considerations were used to
decide if an issue was "important" or "should be" settled
by the Court? Did different chambers have different
views on what makes an issue "important" or one that
"should be" settled by the Court? [If yes] In what way?
b. In general cases, do some of these factors have greater weight than
others? [If yes] Which ones?
c. How much did the clerk's certiorari memos track the Rule 10
factors?
d. What other factors or considerations have an impact on certiorari
in general cases?
i. What was the effect, if any, of the solicitor general's
views?
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ii. What was the effect, if any, of amicus support?
iii. What was the effect, if any, of the identity of the attorneys
petitioning or opposing certiorari?
iv. What was the effect, if any, of any agenda setting by a
Justice or the Court?
Certiorari Considerations in Patent Cases
3. Because there is generally no circuit split in patent cases, what
considerations were used to determine certiorari in patent appeals?
a. In patent cases, do some of these factors have greater weight than
others? [If yes] Which ones?
b. What was the effect, if any, of conflicts with prior Supreme Court
precedent? Was this consideration more or less important in
patent cases than in general cases?
c. What was the effect, if any, of important unsettled questions of
law? Was this consideration more or less important in patent cases
than in general cases?
i. On what basis was a patent issue considered important or
something that "should be" decided at that time?
ii. Did certain Justices have certain issues in patent law that
they sought out cases on?
iii. In patent cases, did the Court consider the effect of a
decision on the stability of patent law when deciding
whether to grant certiorari?
iv. In patent cases, did the Court consider the need for
predictability and clarity of patent law when deciding
whether to grant certiorari?
d. Was any proxy used for a circuit split in patent cases?
i. What was the effect, if any, of dissents from or denials of
en bane review? Any other proxies for circuit split?
e. In patent cases, how much did the clerk's certiorari memos track
the Rule 10 factors?
f. What other factors or considerations have an impact on certiorari
in patent cases?
i. What was the effect, if any, of the solicitor general's
views? Was this consideration more or less important in
patent cases than in general cases?
ii. What was the effect, if any, of amicus support? Was this
consideration more or less important in patent cases than
in general cases?
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iii. What was the effect, if any, of the identity of the attorneys
petitioning or opposing certiorari? Was this consideration
more or less important in patent cases than in general
cases?
iv. What was the effect, if any, of any agenda setting by a
Justice or the Court? Was this consideration more or less
important in patent cases than in general cases?
v. Did the nature of the technology at issue have any bearing
on whether the Court granted certiorari? [If yes] In what
way? During your time at the court, what experience did
the clerks in your Justice's chamber have with
technology? With patent law?
vi. Are there any other considerations that had an impact on
certiorari in patent cases? [If yes] Which ones? How, if at
all, did these factors differ than in general cases?
vii. During your time on the court, how did the Court view
the Federal Circuit or what was the prevailing narrative
about the Federal Circuit at the Court?
1. What made you think that?
2. What effect, if any, did this narrative about the
Federal Circuit have on the certiorari process in
patent cases?
3. What effect, if any, did this narrative about the
Federal Circuit have on the certiorari process in
patent cases?
g. In patent cases, do some of these factors have greater
consideration than others? [If yes] Which ones?
h. How else, if at all, did the certiorari process differ in patent cases
than in general cases during your time at the Court? Anything
else?
i. At the time you were with the Court, were there certain types of
issues in patent law that were seen as important for the Supreme
Court to resolve versus for the Federal Circuit to have the last
word on?
i. [If yes] Which ones? Any others?
ii. [For each issue stated by participant] Do you know why
_ was seen as important for the Supreme Court to
resolve versus the Federal Circuit? Why do you think
that?

2020

Certiorari in Patent Cases
j.

621

Was there a sense at the time you were with the court that the
Court should defer to the Federal Circuit on certain issues?
i. [If yes] Which ones? Any others? [For each] Why do you
think that?
ii. How, if at all, did the Court's views on the deference
owed to the Federal Circuit on_ [stated issue] impact
certiorari during your time on the Court? Why do you say
that?

